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Since its inception in 1934, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) has been charged with regulating interstate
communications to promote the public interest.' With that
broad grant of power, Congress created an agency independent
of the three branches of government - the executive, legislative
or judiciary - to solve problems Congress was either not suited
or not politically prepared to handle.2
Over the years, however, the FCC's independent status has
been subtly transformed to a level of abject dependency on its
relationship with Congress. In the last six years, particularly, a
new system of checks and balances on the FCC's decision-mak-
ing power has emerged. In addition to the traditional tools of
oversight, Congress has increasingly resorted to statutory
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1. Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
2. See The Bodyless Arm, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y REV., May 4,1984 at 1.
3. Congressional influence on FCC policymaking has assumed many forms, in-
cluding statutory changes, budgetary limitations, the spur of investigations, continu-
ing oversight by multiple committees, the Senate's confirmation process, and pressure
by individual members of Congress. For a more extensive discussion, see E. KRAS-
Now, L. LONGLEY & H. TERRY, THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION, 87-132 (3d
ed. 1982); see also Krasnow & Shooshan, Congressional Oversight: The Ninety-Second
Congress and the Federal Communications Commission, 26 FED. COMM. BAR J. 81
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moratoriums, as well as periodic authorizations and riders to
appropriation bills, to block or reverse an unusually large
number of major FCC decisions. As a result, the FCC is now
subject to more rigorous congressional control and its ability to
function as an independent agency has been called into
question.
It has been suggested that the FCC and other independent
agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), were never in-
dependent in the first place. William Cary, who once headed
the SEC, aptly described the FCC and other independent agen-
cies as "stepchildren whose custody is contested by both Con-
gress and the Executive, but without very much affection from
either one."'5 Since these agencies are not part of any executive
department, they must function without the political protection
of the President or a cabinet officer. They also lack any effec-
tive means of appealing for popular support. As a result, mem-
bers of Congress have little fear of political reprisal when
interacting with these defenseless agencies.
Former FCC Chairman Newton Minow distinctly recalls that
shortly after his appointment, he called upon House Speaker
Sam Rayburn. "Mr. Sam" put his arm around the new chair-
man and said, "Just remember one thing, son. Your agency is
an arm of the Congress. You belong to us. Remember that,
and you'll be all right."' 6 The Speaker went on to warn him to
expect a lot of trouble and pressure in his new job. However, as
Minow recalls, "What he did not tell me was that most of the
pressure would come from the Congress itself."7
While the above anecdote suggests that a power struggle be-
tween the FCC and Congress was inevitable, the last six years
have demonstrated that the way the game is played has
(1973). The influence of Congressional staff members cannot be overlooked. Staff
members of relevant Congressional committees maintain a close liaison with the FCC
and often impart committee members' views and expectations to the Commission and
FCC staff members. A 1975 Senate study found that staff communications with
agency personnel was the technique most frequently used by Congress in overseeing
the operation of regulatory agencies. See COMMITTEE ON GOV'T. OPERATIONS, 95TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION 81 (Comm. Print 1977).
4. See irfra text accompanying notes 13 & 14.
5. Minow, Book Review, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 384 (1968), (quoting W. CARY, Pou.
TICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES (1967)).
6. 1&
7. N. MINow, EQUAL TIME: THE PRIVATE BROADCASTER AND THE PUBLIC INTER.
EST 35 (1964).
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changed. Traditionally, if parties lost their cases before the
FCC, they filed an appeal with the courts. If that route failed,
the parties could seek remedial legislation from Congress. To-
day parties frequently take their cases directly to Capitol Hill,
often before the FCC has completed its proceedings, and, in
some cases, before the issue has been formally presented to the
FCC.
Whether the present relationship between Congress and the
FCC is viewed as more effective oversight, or as unwarranted
interference, those whose interests are affected by FCC regula-
tion must understand what these recent changes signify. On
major telecommunications matters, we may now have 535
"Commissioners" to reckon with, not five.
II
Legislative Vetoes and Moratoriums
Over the last decade, Congress has frequently passed special
and narrow legislation to override specific initiatives taken by
various regulatory agencies.' Until recently, the FCC generally
escaped such action even though it made a number of highly
controversial decisions. For example, in the late 1960s, the
FCC's decisions to open up domestic telephone equipment and
long distance markets to competition9 were carefully reviewed
by Congress,'0 as a result of criticisms by AT&T and the Com-
munications Workers of America. These decisions, however,
were never vetoed or reversed by Congress. Similarly, the
FCC's decisions to deregulate cable television" and radio 2
8. For example, in 1974, Congress passed legislation that barred the Department
of Transportation from proceeding with its proposal to require an ignition interlock
system. See Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 93-492, § 109, 88 Stat.
1470, 1482 (1974). In 1977, Congress overruled the Food and Drug Administration's
proposed ban on saccharin. See Saccharin Study and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 95-203,
§ 391 Stat. 1451, 1452 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1982)). In the same year, Congress
intervened by statute to delay auto emission standards. See Clean Air Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-95, § 201, 91 Stat. 685, 671 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (1982)). § 201, Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order, 420 § 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
9. See Carterfone, Memorandum Opinion and Order 13 F.C.C.2d 42, recon. de-
nied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968); Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204 (1974); Micro-
wave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969); Specialized Common Carrier
Services, First Report and Order, 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971).
10. See, e.g., Competition in the Telecommunications Industry: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Comm, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).




were highly controversial, but did not precipitate congressional
intervention.13
In 1983, however, Congress twice used the threat of legisla-
tion to reverse FCC decisions before those decisions had been
finally adopted. The House of Representatives passed legisla-
tion which reversed the FCC's telephone access charge propo-
sal and prohibited the Commission from imposing a monthly
two dollar "customer access line charge" (CALC) on residential
customers and a six dollar CALC on business users. 14 The
House also passed a bill which imposed a six-month morato-
rium on the FCC's efforts to revise its restrictions on television
networks operating in the syndication market15 - the so-called
financial interest/syndication rules.16
Ultimately, neither bill was enacted because the FCC re-
treated from its own decisions in the wake of strenuous con-
gressional opposition. As a result of these threats, the FCC (1)
delayed imposing any end user charges on residential and small
business customers for eighteen months, and eventually scaled
back its proposed access charge to a phased-in plan of one dol-
lar in 1985 and a second dollar in 1986,11 and (2) "back-
burnered" its efforts to reform the financial interest/syndica-
tion rules.'
In both instances, the "losers" at the FCC built successful co-
alitions on Capitol Hill and thwarted the FCC's initiative, while
the "winners" (the telephone industry and the television net-
works, respectively) proved ineffective in defending their regu-
latory gains.
The initial "losers" in the telephone rate fight were mostly
12. Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 paras. 1-3 (1981),
affd in part remanded in part, Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
13. See, e.g., Cable Television Regulation Oversight: Hearings before the Sub.
comm. on Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Comm. 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
14. H.R. REP. No. 483, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-7 (1983) (accompanying H.R. 2250).
15. H.R. 2250, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H9256 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1983).
See also Amendment of Part 47, Tentative Decision and Request for Further Com-
ments, 94 F.C.C.2d 1019, para. 1 (1983).
16. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.658, 73.658(k) (1984).
17. Amendment of Part 67 of the Commission's Rules and Establishment of a
Joint Board, 49 Fed. Reg. 48, 325 (1984) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 67) (proposed
Dec. 12, 1984); Amendment, 50 Fed. Reg. 939 (1985) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 67,
69).
18. Letter from Mark S. Fowler to Senator Ted Stevens (Nov. 16, 1983) (inform.
ing Senators of FCC's decision not to modify 47 CFR § 73.558(J)(7)(i), (ii)).
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consumer groups who were later joined by state regulators and
organized labor in urging key legislators to block the Commis-
sion's access charge plan and prevent an increase in telephone
rates. Similarly, the "losers" in the financial interest/syndica-
tion rules found themselves allied with a strategic group of
forces. This legislative drama was produced and directed by the
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), a group rep-
resenting the major studios, many of which are also large syndi-
cators. As the action intensified, independent television station
owners joined the MPAA out of fear that the supply of syndi-
cated programming on which they rely would be threatened by
increased network control. In both fights, the "losers" became
"winners" when Congress threatened to enact special legisla-
tion designed to "veto" the Commission's decision.
The moratorium has been an attractive legislative tool for
politicians who find themselves in the middle of a heated con-
troversy. This tool offers relative political safety because sup-
porters can argue that they are not taking sides on the merits
(which, of course, they are) but rather are seeking a fuller con-
sideration of the issue. Since a moratorium has the effect of
preserving the status quo, it places a heavy burden on those
parties who support change to demonstrate that the prevailing
rules are "broke" and need fixing. Even the threat of such leg-
islation has substantive consequences on the FCC. While this
form of legislative duress is not new, the 98th Congress was the
first to use it to block rulemakings by the FCC.
III
Periodic Authorization
Today, the FCC faces more rigorous supervision than it did in
the past because it has lost its status as a permanently author-
ized agency.1 9 Historically, most federal programs were perma-
nently authorized; at the end of World War II nearly 95 percent
of the federal budget was under permanent authorization.20 A
permanent authorization usually has no fixed term and does
not refer to any specific fiscal year. Moreover, it usually con-
tains no dollar limitations, authorizing "such sums as may be
19. See infra text accompanying note 31.
20. Improving Congressional Control over the Budget: A Compendium of Materi.
ala Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, Subcomnm on Budgetary, Management and
Expenditures, 93rd Cong., 2d. Sess. 262 (1973).
1987]
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necessary."'2' Annual control over a permanently authorized
agency's budget, and often over its substantive decisions, rests
with the appropriations committees. 22
In the 1970s, Congress shifted an increasing number of agen-
cies from permanent to annual or multi-year (i.e., two to five
year) authorizations.2s Approximately half of the federal
budget remains subject to permanent authorization.24 This
change in the nature of authorizations reflects the proliferation
of subcommittees and the growth of congressional staff. As
Congress developed more expertise, the legislative committees
and their subcommittees wanted to exercise tighter control
over agencies and programs within their jurisdictions. Further-
more, since the use of annual authorizations reduces the time
available for consideration by the appropriations committees, it
virtually insures that the legislative committees will retain pri-
mary oversight and policy responsibility. While the constraints
on the appropriations process are less severe with multi-year
authorizations, the need for Congress to authorize an agency on
a periodic basis nonetheless strengthens the oversight power of
legislative committees.2 With regard to the FCC authoriza-
tion, the Senate and House Commerce Committees are the leg-
islative committees which have gained additional power.
Eliminating the FCC's permanent authorization was initially
suggested in 1978 with the first proposed "rewrite" of the Com-
munications Act.2 Representative James T. Broyhill (R.,
N.C.), the ranking Republican member of the House Energy
and Commerce Committee, subsequently proposed a three-year
authorization for the FCC.27 Later, his approach was endorsed
in legislation backed by a coalition of key Senate Republican
21. U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MANUAL ON
THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 35 (1982).
22. HOUSE BUDGET COMM., 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF
THE BUDGET 19 (Comm. Print 1977).
23. Id. at 22-24.
24. Id. at 19.
25. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 899 (1981).
Regular and systematic oversight will increase Commission accountability
for the implementation of Congressional policy. Congress will benefit from
greater exposure to the Commission's expertise on the policy implications
presented by the new telecommunications services made possible by rapidly
changing technologies. The Commission, in turn, will have a better apprecia-
tion of Congressional intent.Id
26. H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CoNG. REC. 16,729 (1978).
27. H.R. 1801, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 2105 (1981).
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leaders.? One of the Senate co-sponsors, Bob Packwood (R.,
Ore.), made it clear that he was proposing the change to enable
the Commerce Committee, which he chaired, to monitor the
Commission's activities more closely.2
Spurred by their Republican colleagues' interest in reform,
House Democrats introduced legislation to require periodic
authorization of the FCC.' Concerned about substantive pol-
icy as well as budget matters, both Republican and Democratic
members of Congress tried to keep the FCC on a tighter rein.
Neither the Senate bill nor the House bill passed. However,
a rider to the Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 replaced
the FCC's permanent authorization with a two-year
authorization.1
The shift to biennial authorizations not only strengthened
the oversight roles of the House and Senate Commerce Com-
mittees, but also created an attractive legislative vehicle for
changing the Communications Act every two years. Because an
authorization bill has its own momentum, this legislative vehi-
cle has been used successfully to make amendments to the
Communications Act which otherwise would be much more
difficult to enact on their own.
The FCC Authorization Act of 1983 demonstrated that Con-
gress would not hesitate to use its new power.3 The legislation
contained twelve substantive provisions, including prohibitions
on the Corporation for Public Broadcasting's funding of Na-
tional Public Radio, relaxation of the regional concentration of
ownership rules for certain broadcast stations which made
changes in technical facilities to improve service and bans on
obscene messages made available over "Dial-A-Porn" tele-
phone services.3
The provision which may have the greatest impact was an
amendment that established a national policy "to encourage
28. S. 821, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 5653 (1981).
29. Id.
30. H.R. 3239, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 11,715 (1981).
31. Congress used the Budget Reconciliation Act to mandate several other
changes at the FCC. Congress created the position of Managing Director, required an
expanded annual report to the Congress and ordered the FCC to complete its revi-
sions to the Uniform System of Accounts used by telephone companies.
32. Federal Communications Commission Authorization Act of 1983, Pub. L. No.




the provision of new technologies and services to the public."3' 4
Through this provision, Congress created a statutory presump-
tion that any new technology or service is in the public inter-
est,3 5 and required the FCC to make a public interest
determination as to any new technology or service within one
year after a petition or application is filed. 6
In 1985, the FCC authorization was incorporated into the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, and
was finally passed in 1986.31 In this instance, Congress ap-
proved the FCC's reauthorization for two years without adding
any substantive provisions. However, an effort to bar UHF/
VHF swaps between commercial and non-commercial broad-
casters was narrowly defeated in the Senate Commerce Com-
mittee markup.
It is clear that by requiring biennial authorizations, Congress
created another pressure point to enhance its control over FCC
decision-making. As a result, the Commission's independence
has been considerably reduced.
IV
Appropriations: Riders and Reports
Perhaps more vividly than any other form of influence, the
appropriations process underscores the myth of the FCC's in-
dependent status. Through its hold on the FCC's purse strings
- a power shared with the Office of Management and Budget
which reviews the agency's budget - Congress can control not
only the total amount of money allocated to the FCC, but also
the purposes for which funds may be used. The impact of the
97th, 98th and 99th Congresses on FCC policymaking was even
more significant because of changes in the traditional use of the
appropriations process to oversee the FCC.
A common form of congressional control over regulatory
agencies is for the appropriations committees to incorporate
policy directives and restrictions in the official reports accom-
panying appropriations bills. When Congress shifted from a




37. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
100 Stat. 82 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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line item to a "lump-sum" agency budget approach,S this prac-
tice became especially prevalent as a means of securing con-
gressional control over specific programs and expenditures.
Although their committee reports are not law, the appropria-
tions committees expect that the reports will be regarded as if
they were, and because the FCC wants to protect future fund-
ing for its operations, it usually fulfills the committees' ex-
pectations.
The typical report accompanying an appropriations bill con-
tains numerous "do's and dont's" which amount to informal di-
rectives for an agency on how to spend its money.39 A classic
example of how the appropriations process can be used to pres-
sure the FCC was seen in 1974. In that year the House Appro-
priations Committee warned the FCC to report back to
Congress by year's end on its plans for dealing with the effects
of televised violence and sexually explicit material on chil-
dren.40 Indicating displeasure with what it saw as the FCC's
dereliction of duty, the Appropriations Committee stated that
it was "reluctant to take punitive action to require the Commis-
sion to heed the views of the Congress, and to carry out its re-
sponsibilities," but added that "if this is what is required to
achieve the desired objectives, such action may be consid-
ered."41 This stern warning led to the FCC's controversial role
in promoting the ill-fated "family-viewing hour."' 4
Similarly, in 1983, a congressional appropriations bill report
urged the FCC to expedite the processing of applications for
low-power television stations. 43 Low-power television was, at
that time, a new service for which the FCC had begun to accept
applications two years earlier. When the FCC authorized this
38. WILLIAM CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 4, 38 (1967).
39. COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, H.R., 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REVOLVING FUNDS:
FULL DISCLosURE NEEDED FOR BETTER CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL 33 (Comm. Print
1977).
40. H.R. REP. No. 1139, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974).
41. Id.
42. Under pressure from the Chairman of the FCC, the major television networks
and the National Association of Broadcasters voluntarily agreed to program the first
hour of "prime time" with fare that was suitable for all members of the family, in-
cluding young children. The controversy arose over what some parties saw as censor-
ship by the FCC in formulating policy. See Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v.
FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated and rem'd, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). See also G. COWAN, SEE No EviI: THE BACK-
STAGE BATTLE OVER SEX AND VIOLENCE ON TELEVISION (1980).
43. S. REP. No. 206, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1983).
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new service, it had given seemingly little or no thought to how
the thousands of applications would be processed. As the back-
log increased, congressional pressure began to build, especially
from Senate Democrats who charged that the Republican-con-
trolled FCC might be dragging its feet in order to protect ex-
isting broadcasters from competition, while at the same time
extolling the virtues of deregulation and "marketplace forces"
as support for deregulation."
. Historically, the appropriations committees have been reluc-
tant to use the committee reports which accompany appropria-
tion bills to make broad policy statements. In the 98th
Congress, however, a Senate Appropriations Committee report
reiterated congressional support for the FCC's political broad-
casting rules, and warned the FCC not to weaken or eliminate
the rules in any way.45 The Committee's intent was to head off
FCC rulemakings aimed at removing the personal attack and
political editorial rules and at modifying the general Fairness
Doctrine. However, the FCC issued a controversial report on
the Fairness Doctrine in which it determined that continued
enforcement raised serious constitutional questions.46 Al-
though, as a matter of law, a committee report does not have
the same force and effect as a statutory restriction, the FCC
abandoned its effort to repeal the rules when faced with this
congressional pressure.
Congress can also attach provisos to an appropriations bill
which limit expenditures, prohibit expenditures for certain
purposes, or require expenditures for particular activities.
Such provisos have the force of law and legally require the FCC
to follow the congressional directive. However, provisos and
other statutory limitations can create problems because of
House and Senate rules which prohibit the inclusion of legisla-
tion in appropriation bills. 47 The rules were intended to protect
and preserve the oversight jurisdiction of legislative or substan-
tive committees. Therefore, any appropriations bill with a leg-
44. Deregulation of the Telecommunications Industry: Hearings Before the
Comm. on Appropriations, Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, and State,
The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 67 (1984)
(statement of Sen. Paul Laxalt).
45. See supra note 43.
46. Fairness Doctrine, Report and Order, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, para. 19 (1985).
47. RULEs OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 403, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 525 (1978); SENATE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. No. 21, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 132-33
(1973).
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islative provision is subject to a point of order on the Senate or
House floor."
Often there is a fine line between telling a federal agency
how it should spend its funds and establishing new law or pol-
icy. Consequently, these parliamentary rules have generated a
substantial body of interpretation and precedent. Despite these
rules, Congress has used riders to make policy on issues rang-
ing from prayer in schools to gay rights.49
The 98th Congress used an appropriations bill rider to block
the FCC's liberalization of its television group ownership
rules. ° The FCC originally decided to increase the maximum
number of stations allowed by one owner from seven to twelve
and to "sunset" or eliminate its group ownership rules alto-
gether in 1990.1 Even before the FCC had the opportunity to
act on petitions for reconsideration of its original decision, op-
ponents took their case to Congress. The attack was led by the
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), a minor par-
ticipant in the FCC's rulemaking proceeding, but one which
was concerned that the new rule would increase the power of
the three commercial television networks.
Immediate criticism of the FCC's action came from Senator
Pete Wilson (R-Cal.), whose state is home to most of the
MPAA's members, and from Congressman Timothy Wirth (D-
Colo.), Chairman of the House Telecommunications Subcom-
mittee. Senator Wilson attached a rider to the Supplemental
Appropriations Bill, which prohibited the FCC from changing
its ownership rules until April 1, 1985 or sixty days after the
FCC's reconsideration of the decision, whichever was later.52
Despite the fact that FCC Chairman Mark Fowler agreed to
withhold action,53 as he had done with access charges and the
financial interest/syndication rules, the House adopted the
Senate-passed measure in the closing days of the 98th Con-
gress.5 The FCC's proposed decision had, in effect, been ve-
48. See supra note 47.
49. WALTER J. OESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS
117 (1978).
50. H.R. 6040, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
51. Amendment of Section 73.3555, Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 18, para. 5
(1984).
52. See supra note 50.
53. See supra note 18.
54. Federal Communications Commission Authorization Act of 1983, Pub. L. No.
98-214, 97 Stat. 1467 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 156).
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toed by Congress even before its final adoption by the agency.
In December, 1984, the FCC modified its original decision by
eliminating the "sunset" provision, introducing incentives
which reward minority ownership and adding a limitation on
the audience reach of a group's stations.55 Senator Wilson, who
helped negotiate the amended rule, hailed the FCC's action as
an enlightened compromise, while Commissioner James Quello
said the FCC had been hit by an "absolute steamroller."M
In the closing days of the 99th Congress, the Senate attached
several riders to the catch-all continuing resolution (the regula-
tion which keeps the federal government running in the ab-
sence of final action on a number of appropriation bills).57 One
such rider directed the FCC to consider alternatives to repeal-
ing the Fairness Doctrine and then report to Congress.-" The
language reflected a compromise with the broadcast industry
which had lobbied against a stronger amendment. That partic-
ular amendment would have forced the FCC to reconsider its
controversial Fairness Doctrine Report. Another rider effec-
tively barred the FCC for one year from considering the swaps
of commercial VHF for noncommercial UHF frequencies.59
Given a second bite at the FCC's funding apple, Senate oppo-
nents of such swaps succeeded in 1986 where they had failed in
1985.
V
Implications of the Changing Relationship
The increasing use of these forms of legislative "redress" has
clearly reduced the FCC's independence. To the extent that
this intervention by Congress on policy matters reflects a legis-
lative consensus, it is a necessary concomitant of a democratic
system. On the other hand, it is much more troubling when the
55. Amendment of Section 73.3555, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 100
F.C.C.2d 74, para. 3 (1985).
56. Broadcast Regulation: Backstage View, BROADCASTING, Jan. 14, 1985, at 59.
57. Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat.
3341 (1986) (amending Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 1783 (1986) because of ommissions
due to errors).
58. Id. See also Conference Report to Accompany H.R. J. RES. 738 H.R. REP. No.
1005, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 431 (1986) (The report states, "It is the intent of the
conferees that the Federal Communication Commission shall not change the regula-
tion concerning the Fairness Doctrine without submitting the required report to Con-
gres on this matter.").
59. See supra note 55.
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threat of veto is in the hands of a few legislators who have in-
fluence over the FCC, but who do not represent majority views
in the Congress. Whenever a minority of the Congress is suc-
cessful in micro-managing the decisions of the FCC, the consti-
tutional process is undermined. Newton Minow pointed out
that "it is easy - very easy - to confuse the voice of one Con-
gressman, or one Congressional committee, with the voice of
Congress. "' More recently, in a farewell address to the Fed-
eral Communications Bar Association, Commissioner Robert E.
Lee observed:
Every Commissioner is tested in his or her early days by
requests for special attention. Many times these requests are
legitimate; they seek redress for unreasonable delay or bu-
reaucratic red tape. Of course, one must respond. But if spe-
cial favors are granted, the requests never stop and one finds
535 bosses calling the tune.61
Behind-the-scenes "lobbying" by Congressmen can also sub-
vert the safeguards for comments and public participation man-
dated by Congress in the Administrative Procedure Act.62
Such private contacts with FCC Commissioners by individual
Representatives and Senators, which are instigated by parties
with vested interests, have the effect of denying administrative
fairness. These contacts can have the same debilitating effects
on FCC independence as requests by Congressional staffers for
drafts of FCC decisions before they have been finally and for-
mally adopted. As a result of an increasing number of off-the-
record contacts, the courts may well be called upon to reverse
administrative action which has been "improperly influenced"
by covert legislative pressure.63
The "behind closed doors" approach should be contrasted
with attempts by individual members of Congress to influence
FCC decision-making by means of on-the-record contacts.
Thus, while Commissioner Quello labeled as "preposterous"
the charge that the Commission permitted political pressures
to "infest" its must-carry proceeding (the adoption of new cable
television "must-carry" rules), he openly acknowledged that he
was impressed by the unprecedented on-the-record Congres-
60. Minow, supra note 7, at 35.
61. Robert E. Lee, Remarks to the Federal Communications Bar Association 8
(June 10, 1981) (mimeographed).
62. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).
63. See D.C. Fed'n. of Civic Ass'n v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972).
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sional support for some form of must-carry rules: "It was the
very first time that I can recall in my 12-1/2 years on the Com-
mission that I saw a letter requesting Commission action signed
by every member, Republican and Democrat, of the House
Communications Subcommittee."" This overt political pres-
sure, taken to the extreme, can also undermine the regulatory
process if the agency in question is perceived as a political
"punching-bag."
Lacking clear legislative guidance in the Communications
Act as to the definition of the "public interest," the FCC is
more vulnerable than most independent regulatory agencies to
pressures from individual members of Congress. Indeed,
almost every major decision of the Fowler FCC bears the fin-
gerprints (or heavy footprints) of one or more influential Con-
gressmen and Senators. One reason for this unprecedented
involvement by the Hill is that Chairman Fowler, unlike his
predecessors, was outspoken in the pursuit of deregulation and
during his tenure, became personally identified with many of
the most controversial initiatives of the FCC.
Perceived as an ideologue and plagued by early failures to
keep the Hill adequately informed as to his agenda, Fowler
learned Sam Rayburn's definition of "independence" the hard
way-but he did learn. He created a special Congressional liai-
son position in his own office and substantially upgraded the
Commission's Congressional and Public Affairs Office. Fowler
also spent more time making personal contacts to brief key
lawmakers on Capitol Hill in advance of important FCC
decisions.
Soon after the 100th Congress convened, Mark Fowler an-
nounced his intention to leave the FCC after the longest tenure
as chairman in the agency's history. Some observers speculated
that his decision to leave well before the end of the Reagan ad-
ministration was motivated, in part, by a desire to avoid what
were likely to be bitter reconfirmation hearings in the Senate
for a new term. Fowler's successor. as chairman, Dennis Pat-
rick, inherits the same policy controversies and institutional
challenges his predecessor faced. Patrick's success as chairman
will depend on how effectively he resolves those controversies
64. Statement on "Must-Carry" for the Record of the Commission Meeting Au-
gust 7, 1986 of Commissioner James H. Quello 2 (attached to FCC, News (Aug. 7, 1986)
(Report No. DC-593)).
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and meets those challenges.' His challenge will be to preserve
the important policies of the Fowler years (most of which he
strongly supported) while, at the same time, restoring some of
the FCC's independence from unwarranted Congressional
interference.
In the years ahead, the real challenge for the FCC will be to
learn from the lessons of its past and not overreact to the Hill.
The first tests will come early in the 100th Congress when Con-
gress reacts to a number of controversial issues: the court's re-
mand of the Fairness Doctrine and the minority preference
proceedings, the fall-out over the final must-carry rules, the in-
creases in telephone customer access charges and the continu-
ing turmoil caused by the deregulation of AT&T. These tests
will be even tougher for the FCC now that the Senate is in
Democratic hands for the first time in six years. The outcome
will have a lot to say about the future of the FCC as an "in-
dependent" agency.
65. See White House Picks Patrick as Chairman, BROADCASTING, Jan. 26, 1987 at
41; FCC Takes Aim at Fairness Doctrine, Comm. Daily, Jan. 26, 1987 at 2-3, col. 1;
Fowler Exit May Spur Domino Effect, Comm. Week, Jan. 26, 1987 at 1, col. 2.
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